Untangling the Spider’s Web:
Four Practical Recommendations to Improve Domestic Force Protection Against the Growing Drone Threat

When reports of Ukraine’s recent attack on Russian air bases, entitled Operation Spider’s Web, began to surface on 2 June 2025, the world was awestruck by Ukraine’s ability to successfully launch a major covert operation deep inside of Russian territory.[1] In total, Ukraine claimed to have hit 41 strategic bombers and destroyed at least 13 aircraft during the course of the operation, all using small drones smuggled into the country and launched against Russia’s protected military bases.[2] This operation should be viewed as both a remarkable achievement and a terrifying eye-opener for the United States and its forces abroad and at home.

Operation Spider’s Web may one day be viewed as the harbinger of a new era of warfighting—one no longer reliant on overwhelming air, missile, and space forces, but one of maximum literal bang-for-buck in which cheaply made, highly maneuverable Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are capable of mass destruction. Indeed, similar techniques were reportedly used by Israel in the same month as part of its early attack on targets in Iran, with high effectiveness.[3] While base defense is a focus point for some of the legislative efforts currently working through Congress, we believe Judge Advocates have a role to play in shaping future defense posturing against drone threats (also known as Counter-UAS or Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems, or C-sUAS). This article proposes four ways in which the legal community can support these efforts Stateside.

ONE: Reducing Air Base Online Footprints

One way to augment force and base protection is to take steps to remove information about operational locations from public websites. Apps like Google Maps and Waze present profound implications for base protection; while publicly accessible driving directions are helpful tools for service members, the capability is equally helpful to malicious actors. In the Russia-Ukraine context, for example, Ukrainian artillery units have reportedly used civilian drones in combination with Google Maps to locate and target Russian troops and assets.[4] And Ukraine isn’t the only example: U.S. Special Forces and intelligence agencies were using Google Maps for operational planning and management a decade ago.[5] Additionally, navigation apps similar to those for driving—but for the airspace—continue to gain real traction.[6] Installation commanders should begin taking steps to determine what information should (and should not) be published for anyone to see.

Attorneys of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG Corps) will provide important contributions in determining which information can be withheld from the public and which should remain visible for anyone seeking entry onto the installation. For example, should the location of a sensitive work site be pinpointed on public, online maps for anyone without base access to identify? Probably not. Should installation customer service offices be shielded from public view? Clearly not. Some base services have requirements for maximizing access to potential customers, which would arguably include publicly displaying their office locations to ensure easy access for Department of Defense (DoD) personnel and other entitled recipients.[7] JAG Corps professionals would be critical in assisting base leaders and Security Forces commanders to determine what should remain available vice information that pose security risks. While this recommendation isn’t likely to mitigate all force protection concerns—especially given the lengthy online history of reporting most facilities on public webpages—there is little reason to continue to show our enemies potential targets in plain view. Many countries do not broadcast to the world the specifics of their military installations on publicly available mapping software.[8] Neither should we. As base leaders work to better secure the locations of vital equipment and resources, JAGs will be key advisors in this process.

TWO: Defense Hardening and Contract Streamlining

Contract attorneys in the JAG Corps should be on the front line of supporting acquisition efforts to strengthen the Air Force’s ability to defend itself against UAS attacks on our installations. President Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) on 9 April 2025 entitled, “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base.”[9] This EO states, “To achieve [accelerated defense procurement and a revitalized defense industrial base], the United States will rapidly reform our antiquated defense acquisition processes with an emphasis on speed, flexibility, and execution.”[10] While the specifics of modernizing the procurement process have yet to be finalized, this effort underscores the United States’ focus on rapidly fielding capabilities to support our national security.JAG Corps attorneys can play a pivotal role in fielding capabilities by supporting programs focused on installation defense. This could include developing means to more accurately target and disrupt and/or destroy incoming drone attacks, or concentrate on ways to harden facilities, runways, and hangars against attacks, making them more impervious against a situation such as Russia found itself in when Ukraine penetrated their bases. Regardless of the chosen capabilities, JAG Corps attorneys should be at the forefront of these discussions to ensure the procurement process can move swiftly, effectively, and congruently with legal requirements. This can be accomplished in two ways: first, by working with Security Forces leaders to ensure unit-level contracting requirements are being considered; and second, by working with contract personnel to identify creative contracting mechanisms by which these types of capabilities can be fielded.

The forging of this new path has already begun; many installations already employ some level of non-kinetic anti-drone capabilities.[11] In July 2025, the Army contracted to spend $43M on two advanced anti-drone systems.[12] While promising, these acquisition and implementation efforts are often cost-prohibitive. Another option being explored is the DoD developing its own anti-swarm C-sUAS technologies through the Air Force Research Laboratory.[13] For a more immediate solution, some installations are acquiring portable, handheld, non-kinetic C-sUAS weapon capabilities wieldable by individual users.[14] These capabilities are much lower-cost and widely implementable in the near term. In each of these instances, JAG Corps attorneys can work with installation leaders to help streamline processes using standard Operations and Maintenance funds to swiftly acquire such capabilities and offer an instant boost to base defense.

THREE: Base Monitoring and Drone Registration

Beyond the Base Defense Zone, there are additional ways to heighten awareness in this emerging threat environment. Federal law generally prohibits monitoring of, and gathering intelligence against, U.S. persons, and that certainly is not what we are suggesting.[15] But lawful, enhanced efforts to deter the proven potential of low-cost, drone-driven destruction on military installations is warranted. Here are two areas for the DoD to sharpen.

First, JAG Corps attorneys should support efforts to increase surveillance around the perimeters of our installations. In Operation Spider’s Web, Ukraine smuggled myriad sUAS into Russia hidden in large trucks and left them for a time parked near the target military bases.[16] While Federal law discourages surveillance beyond the installation fence line, video surveillance of the perimeter coupled with periodic foot and vehicle patrols will improve our situational awareness regarding potential threats on roadways, open geography, and areas populated and unpopulated surrounding our installations. Optimally, these patrols and surveillance actions could spot something like the unusual activity preceding the successful Spider’s Web. If prepared with portable, handheld C-sUAS capabilities like those mentioned above, these patrols can offer a first line of defense against Spider’s Web-styled attacks. As domestic defense operations adapt to new threats, JAG Corps attorneys are equipped to navigate legal authorities, assist defenders in establishing new procedures, and understand the legal limits of what is permissible under current law.[17]

Second, in addition to enhanced monitoring and increased awareness around our domestic installations, utilizing statutes currently in place can also contribute to bolstering the security of our military bases. As of 2025, Federal law requires all drones weighing more than 0.55lbs (250g) to be registered with the Federal Aviation Administration, and to carry and broadcast a remote identification during flight.[18] If our military is able to gain access to Federal drone registries, they might reveal any private or corporate owners of unusually large numbers of drones near military bases and could help prevent attacks modeled after Ukraine’s Spider’s Web.

Taking it a step further, by working with the Command’s legislative liaison the JAG Corps can propose updates to FAA’s monitoring requirements. Setting aside for the moment arguments about the necessity (or personal freedom implications) of these laws, enforcement of existing law would be enhanced by requiring that registration at the point of sale. Adding this step to sUAS purchasing would ensure compliance with the existing registration requirement—and assist the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security in flagging single ownership of unusual quantities of drones.

FOUR: Robust Partnerships with State and Local Leaders

Lastly, because Federal law limits the Air Force’s ability to manage certain risks outside the installation, C-sUAS defense must also rely on support from State and local partners. JAG Corps attorneys can support these collaborative efforts in a few significant ways.

First, JAG Corps attorneys should be heavily involved in planning efforts at the local level to develop support agreements with local law enforcement to ensure tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are developed to integrate C-sUAS efforts between military and local law enforcement while remaining compliant with requirements under the Posse Comitatus Act.[19] Though these agreements will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we propose a baseline approach to developing these types of agreements affecting installations within the continental United States.

The types of essential provisions will vary depending on whether the jurisdiction of the land in and around the installation is proprietary or concurrent.[20] In instances where roads and highways off-installation are subject to proprietary jurisdiction—meaning the State maintains sole authority to legislate and police the area—the focus of JAG efforts should be advising installation leaders on how best to interact with local officials to develop methods for ensuring materials on active roadways near the installation cannot pose a threat to the aircraft, personnel, or facilities on the base. Without any Federal enforcement authority, the emphasis under proprietary State jurisdictions must be to facilitate the State’s ability to adequately respond in a way that meets both the State’s and the DoD’s needs.

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One potential line of effort here could be installation leaders and legal offices working with State legislative committees to discuss ways in which State law and regulation can better protect against the risk of a UAS threat. Statutes could prohibit loitering near a military gate, restrict certain materials from being transported in close proximity to a military installation (hazardous materials, large storage crates, etc.), or even limit use of what was previously a public highway to exclusive military or State purposes. Cooperative support agreements in areas subject to proprietary jurisdiction should also outline steps local law enforcement will take to ensure roads bordering military installations are free from hazards that could contribute to the presence of UAVs. For instance, an agreement may indicate that local law enforcement will conduct routine sweeps of highways bordering the fence line or take additional steps to communicate to the population that flying drones or pulling over on highways near military installations is prohibited. Because the Federal government lacks nearly all authority to dictate how “proprietary jurisdiction” lands are used, agreements with State partners (facilitated by JAG Corps attorneys) will be paramount in ensuring the safety of base personnel and operational capabilities.

In situations where the Federal government maintains concurrent jurisdiction—meaning both the Federal government and the State retain shared legislative jurisdiction over the land in and around the installation—the DoD is not so much at the behest of proprietary State control, and the issue shifts focus more toward ensuring force protection is achieved while complying with other Federal requirements. Because the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits military personnel from operating in a civilian law enforcement capacity, support agreements in these jurisdictions must create TTPs that empower local law enforcement to operate quickly when a drone is no longer within the Base Defense Zone. This coordination too will require strong (though different) teaming between military and local law enforcement. Critical coordination between State and military forces already commonly exists at DoD installations, yet C-UAS procedures are still relatively undeveloped and future agreements should place concerted focus on these to enhance defense and further bolster established relationships.

Under any type of jurisdiction, while the specific TTPs may vary from base to base, a baseline approach from the DoD level will provide a framework within which unique local needs are met. From there, a dialogue with civilian leaders to determine ways to reduce the drone threat is a necessary first step in protecting bases from harm. Once these frameworks are in place, JAG Corps personnel will be instrumental in cultivating the relationships between military and civilian leaders to foster cooperation and execution of the agreements established. Holding practice exercises and other events will ensure all parties are prepared to address the threats as they arise—and ideally, beforehand.

Lastly, in addition to the efforts at local and State level, senior JAG Corps personnel should continue to work with Congressional representatives to identify ways in which anti-drone technology and funding can also be provided to municipalities. It’s not enough to develop a robust C-sUAS capability within the military fence line. Given how quickly a drone attack can cause mass damage, these capabilities need to be broadly operational by suitably empowering law enforcement capabilities in vulnerable metropolitan areas, and especially cities and towns near military installations.

Conclusion

Recent drone-based attack plans underscore an evolving spider web of threats where low-cost, highly maneuverable unmanned aerial systems can inflict significant damage on military installations. For the Air Force JAG Corps, this new reality demands proactive engagement beyond traditional legal roles. JAG Corps expertise is indispensable in navigating the complex regulatory, statutory, and constitutional considerations these emerging challenges present. More importantly, the legal office serves as a critical bridge between operational needs, legal compliance, and interagency coordination. As the threat environment continues to evolve, the JAG Corps must rise to the challenge by embedding legal perspectives early in planning and execution phases and by cultivating collaborative relationships across military and civilian jurisdictions. Ultimately, the fight to safeguard our personnel and facilities from drone threats is a shared responsibility—one where the JAG Corps has a distinct and vital role. The time to act is now: to advise, to innovate, and to lead in building resilient defenses that reflect both the realities of modern warfare and the rule of law.

About the Authors

Major John M. Cane

(B.A., Political Science/History, The University of New Mexico; J.D., George Mason University School of Law; LLM, The George Washington University) is a Combat Operations Legal Advisor for the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

Major M. Russ Liechty

(B.A., Political Science, BYU; MBA, Webster University; J.D., BYU Law School) is a Combat Operations Legal Advisor for the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.